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If Students Aren't Learning, Are Teachers Teaching?
Tying New Jersey Teacher Evaluations and Compensation to Student Achievement
Amanda Grossi

Introduction
Since taking office in 2009, President Obama has made education reform one of his top
priorities. Through the Race to the Top program, his administration uses a $5,000,000,000
incentive to challenge states to design and implement rigorous standards aligned to high-quality
assessments, attract and retain high-performing teachers and leaders, and create data systems that
will inform instructional decisions. 1 Obama has remarked, "Too many supporters of my party
have resisted the idea of rewarding excellence in teaching with extra pay, even though we know
it can make a difference in the classroom."2
Chris Christie followed President Obama's lead when he assumed the office of New
Jersey govemor in January 2010. He is a proponent of legislation that creates a "fair, thorough,
data-driven evaluation system" and on Aprill3, 2011, he announced legislative proposals aimed
at education refonn.3 The proposals include a new system of teacher and principal evaluation
and tenure reform.4

In implementing these reform measures time is of the essence. Approximately 1.8
million of the United States' 3.3 million teachers will be eligible to retire within the next ten
1

PL 111-5 Section§ 14005 (d)(2)-(4) "American Recovery & Reinvestment Act of2009"

2

Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the President to the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce
on complete and Competitive American Education (Mar. 10, 2009).
3

Star Ledger Staff. Gov. Christie Pushes for Teacher Merit Pay Based on Students' Performance, NEWARK STARLEDGER(Sep. 28, 2011 ), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/20 10/09/gov christie advocates merit p.html.
4

David Nash & Teresa Moore, Governor's Reform Proposals Redefine StaffEvaluation and Accountability,
LEGALLYSPEAKING, http://www.legallyspeakingmagazine.com/evats.html (last visited December 5, 2011).
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years. As more than half of the education workforce will be replaced~ now is the time to tnake
5

the changes necessary to reshape the nation's educational system.
The New Jersey legislature should enact legislation requiring all New Jersey school
districts to implement a performance-based compensation system for teachers using objective
n1easurements of student performance as the primary (more than 50%) measure of teacher
effectiveness. Additionally, the school at which a teacher is employed should be a significant
factor in the perforn1ance-based compensation system. Thus, a teacher at an underperforming,
high-needs school should receive more compensation than a counterpart at a school that has
historically met its student achievement goals, consequently creating a financial incentive for the
most effective teachers to teach in the schools where they are most needed. .
Section I of this paper examines the theory behind performance-based compensation and
conclusions drawn from studies of its effects in public schools. Section II provides an overview
of how performance-based compensation and related education reform policies have been
implemented in other states, and will relate the outcomes of such in1plementation. Section III
summarizes education reform in New Jersey, including a history of statutes and case law, an
overview of current teacher compensation law and practices, and a detailed examination of
Governor Christie's proposed legislation. Section IV sets forth a detailed plan for creating
effective student achievement-based evaluations and a corresponding performance-based
compensation plan. Section V revisits the opposition to performance-based compensation in
Section I and explains how the plan set forth in Section IV minimizes potential concerns related
to performance-based compensation.
5

Byron Auguste, et al., Closing the Talent Gap: Attracting and Retaining Top-Third Graduates to Careers in
Teaching: An International and Market Research-Based Perspective, ll (20 I 0).
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Section 1: The Effectiveness of Merit-Based Compensation
The current teacher compensation systen1 in n1ost school districts rewards factors that are
not connected to student performance. 6 With traditional salary schedules, salaries are fixed by
district-wide or statewide schedules and provide salary increases according to the number of
years of teaching experience and post-baccalaureate education. 7 This system is often described
as "steps and lanes. " 8
Charles Cotton, reward advisor of the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development
I

(CIPD)

remarked~

"A refusal to make use of bonuses in the private sector removes one of the

most powerful tools the governn1ent has to drive up standards and deliver many and stretching
an1bitions for public service reform and improvement." 9 By changing the seniority-based
compensation status quo, public sector employers can incentivize increased employee
performance. There is evidence, however, that compensation may not be the most effective way
to motivate employees.

6

Eric A. Hanushek, The Single Salary Schedule and Other Issues of Teacher Pay (Hoover Institution, Stanford
Working Paper, 2006).

University~
7

Robin Chait & Reagan Miller, Paying Teachers for Results: A Summa1y ofResearch to Iriform the Design ofPayfor-Performance Programs for High-Poverty Schools (2009).
8

Stephen Sawchuk, Dis!Piats TryOut Revamped Teaaher Pay Systems, EDUCATION WEEK (J.tov. 10, 2010)
httJ?://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2010/ll/10/lldegrees ep.h30.html. The term "lane'' refers to the teacher's postbaccalaureate education. The tem1 "steps" refers to the number of years of teaching experience. The "steps and
lanes" salary schedules were first developed in the 1920s and were popular with teachers' unions because they
"prevented favoritism by administrators or discrimination on the basis of race, gender, or position."
9

Nick Huber, Performance-Related Pay Should be Increased in the Public Sector to Drive Reforms, Says the CIPD.
PERSONNEL TODAY (June 16, 20 I 0). httJ?://www .Qersonneltoday.comlarticles/20 10/06/16/55960/performancerelated-pay-should-be-increased-in-public-sector-to-drive-reforms-says"the-cipd.html.
Cotton's comments are in response to a survey that showed 36% of public sector employees believe their pay should
be based on perfo11nance compared to 68% of private sector employees. Only 6% of public sector employees
believe the performance of their organization should affect their pay compared to 35% of private sector employees.

3

American psychologist, Frederick Herzberg proposed the Motivation-Hygiene Theory of
job satisfaction in 1968. The theory suggests that the factors producing job satisfaction
(n1otivation factors) are separate from the factors leading to job dissatisfaction (hygiene
factors). 10 Herzberg analyzed 16 on-the-job factors and their correlation to satisfaction or
dissatisfaction. 11 Achievement, recognition, the work itself, responsibility, and growth or
advancen1ent are motivation factors, while salary is a hygiene factor. 12
Of the hygiene factors, however, salary had a significant n1otivation component. 13 As
Jack Jennings, Founder and CEO of the Center on Education Policy remarked, "Money is never
the reason why people enter teaching, but it is the reason why some people do not enter teaching,
or leave after a few years. " 14 The rationale for performance-based compensation for teachers is

10

Frederick Herzberg, One More Time, How Do You Motivate Employees?, 65 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW 109,
(1987).
11

!d. at 117. The study sampled 1,685 employees who experienced a total of 1,844 and 1,753 job events that led to
job satisfaction and dissatisfaction, respectively. Each event was the result of one or more of the 16 factors. The
factors were then classified as motivation or hygiene based on whether they were more often a factor that led to job
satisfaction or dissatisfaction.

The sample of 1,685 employees included "low level supervisors, professional woman, agricultural administrators,
men about to retire from management positions, hospital maintenance personnel, manufacturing supervisors, nurses,
food handlers, military officers, engineers, scientists, housekeepers, teachers (emphasis added), technicians, female
assemblers, accountants, Finnish forema11; and Hungarian engineers. The data is not disaggregated by occupation:
teacher-specific data is not published.
12

!d. at 116. The other hygiene factors are company policy and administrative supervision, relationship with
supervisor, work conditions, relationship with peers, relationship with subordinates, status and security.
13

!d. at 116. Salary was a factor in approximately 6% of events that led to extreme job satisfaction and in
approximately 9% of event that led to extreme job dissatisfaction. This 3% difference is the second smallest of the
ten hygiene factors and indicates that salary also has a motivational effect.
14

Jack Jennings, Higher Wages Would Attract, Keep Better Teachers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, website (Nov.
9, 2011) http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/are-teachers-overpaidlhigher-wages-would-attract-better-teachers.

4

that it has the potential to minimize shortages in specific subject areas in schools~ create a more

r

ts

equitable distribution of effective teachers, and improve overall teacher qua Ity.
There is legitimate debate regarding the effectiveness of performance-based
compensation in increasing student achievement. Both proponents and opponents of
performance-based compensation have empirical data supporting their positions. In 2006, a
grant from the United States Department of Education's Institute of Education Science
established the National Center on Performance Incentives (NCPI) to conduct research on the
effects of performance incentives on teachers~ students, and institutions.

16

NCPI has published

research on performance-based compensation systems in New York City, Texas, and Nashville.
From 2008 to 2011, New York City in1plemented a pilot program for performance-based
con1pensation called the School-Wide Performance Bonus Progran1 (SPBP).

17

During its first

two years, the results of the study showed there was no statistical significance between the
performance of students whose teachers received performance-based compensation and the
performance of students whose teachers did not. 18 In the third year of the study the students

15

Robin Chait, Current State Policies that Reform Teacher Pay: An Examination ofPay..for-Performance in Eight
States, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (November Sl 2007).
16

National Center on Perfonnance Incentives, www.performanceincentives.org (last visited on December 5, 2011).

17

Matthew Springer & Marcus A. Winters; New York City's School-Wide Bonus Pay Program: Early Evidence from
a Randomized Trial (},.fational Center on Performance Inaentives, V/orking Paper No. 2009..02, 2009).
18

!d. at 4. Data for the 2007-2008 school year was used and is represented as the first year of the study even though
there were less than three months between the date at which schools volunteered for the program and the date in
which the high stakes tests were administered.
The unit of acco~tability was the school. Each schooPs rating was based on student progress in English language
arts and mathematics (55%)~ student perfonnance on New York's high stakes test in English Ianguao-e arts and
ma~ematics (30%), and student attendance and student, parent, and teacher perceptions ofthe scho;lleaming
envtror.ment (IS%). !d. at 19.

5

whose teachers did not receive perfom1ance-based compensation outperformed their
counterparts. 19 In January 2011, the school district suspended the program.
Teachers reported that even though the bonus was desirable, they did not change their
teaching practice in response to the program. 20 SPBP teacher buy-in is questionable due to
several characteristics of the program. First, the compensation syste1n was unique in that a fourperson comn1ittee at each school determined the bonuses of individual teachers. 21 Second, there
was inconsistent measurement of proficiency. Of the participating teachers, 62% received a
bonus in the first year, 84% received a bonus in the second year, and, due to increased
proficiency thresholds, only 13% received a bonus in the third year. 22 Additionally, surveys
showed that more than one-third of participating teachers did not understand the SPBP targets
and determination of bonus amounts. Teachers also overestimated whether, and the extent to
which, their school would receive an award. 23 Although the study indicates that performancebased compensation does not affect student perfom1ance, the short··teml nature of the study,
unusual determination of bonus an1ounts, changing levels of proficiency, and teachers'
misconceptions, suggest that the data is not conclusive regarding performance-based
compensation schemes, in general. Even the researchers admit that a certain set of conditions: "a

19

Julie A. Marsh, et al., What New York City's Experiment with Schoolwide Performance Bonuses Tells Us About
Pay for Performance (RAND Corporation 2011)
www.rand.org/contentldam/rand/pubs/monographs/20 11 /RAND MG 1114.pdf.
20

!d. at 1.

21

Springer, supra note 17, at 20. The program allowed each school to receive an award up to $3000 per teacher and
the fourwperson school committee determined the amount each faculty member would receive. The bonuses
awarded ranged from $7 to $5,914. The rationale for this system is not given, but may have affected teacher buy-in.
22

Marsh, supra note 19, at 253.

23

!d. at 254.

6

reasonable timeline and a high degree of understanding~ expectancy, valence, buy-i~ and
perceived fairness" were lacking in the progrrun.

24

NCPI also conducted a study of the District Awards for Teacher Excellence (D.A.T.E.)
program in Texas?5 Texas teachers were divided into two groups: one group was eligible for
perfom1ance-based compensation and the other was not. At all grades (3rd to 11th), the students
of teachers ineligible for performru1ce-based compensation outperfom1ed the students of teachers
who were eligible. Over the five years of the study, however, the performance gap between
D.A.T.E. teachers and non-D.A.T.E. teachers narrowed. 26
The Project on Incentives in Teaching (POINT) was a three-year study ofperfomlancebased compensation in Nashville. 27 The program focused on the idea that for teachers to
increase their effectiveness, the n1onetary incentive must be significant. Under the project,

$15,000 was the maximum bonus and was awarded to teachers whose students perfom1ed in the
95th percentile?8 Again, the students whose teachers were eligible for bonuses did not
outperform the students of teachers who were ineligible.
In another NCPI study ofperfom1ance-based compensation, the study showed the
opposite result: cotTelation between perfom1ance-based compensation and student

24

!d. at 257.

25

Matthew G. Springer, et al., District Awards for Teacher Excellence (D.A. T.E.) Program: Final Evaluation
Report (National Center on Perfonnance Incentives, 201 0).
26

ld. at 103~107.

27

Matthew G. Springer, et al, Teacher Pay for Performance: Experimental Evidence from the Project on Incentives
in Teaching (National Center on Perfonnance Incentives, 2010).

28

Id at xi. Teachers whose students performed in the 90th percentile received a $10,000 bonus and teachers whose
students performed in the 80th percentile received a $5,000 bonus.

7

performance.29 The Teacher Advancement Program (TAP) operates in 180 schools located in 15
states and serves approximately 5,000 teachers affecting approximately 60,000 students. TAP
teachers can receive a maximum bonus of$12~000. 30 In the study, TAP schools in two states
were compared to their non-TAP counterparts. 31 In every grade except 9th grade, TAP schools
outperfom1ed non-TAP schools in a fall-to-spring test score gain at a statistically significant
level. 32 However, as the grade level increased, the gap between TAP and non-TAP performance
decreased. 33 While this positive association supports the argument that performance-based
compensation increases student performance, a basic understanding ofTAP is necessary.
According to the TAP website, it has four elements of success, one of which is performancebased compensation. 34 Since performance-based compensation is not the only difference
between TAP and non-TAP schools, it cannot be isolated as the cause of increased student
performance.

Matthew G. Springer, et al.~ Impact ofthe Teacher Advancernent Program on Student Test Score Gains: Findings
from an Independent Appraisal) 1 (National Center on Performance Incentives, Working Paper 2008-19, 2008).
29

30

Id. at note 6 and page 3. To determine bonuses, teachers are placed into one of five levels. Teachers at the same
level receive the same bonus. Level I teachers are those whose students performed two standard deviations below
the state average. Level2 teachers are those whose students perfonned one standard deviation below the state
average. Level3 teachers are those whose students performed within one standard deviation ofthe state average.
Level 4 teachers are those whose students performed one standard deviation above the state average. Level 5
teachers are those whose students performed two standard deviations above the state average.
31

Id. at 3. The unit of accountability was the teacher. Each teacher's rating was based on classroom observation
(50%), value-added measurement on a high stakes test (30%)~ and school-wide performance on a high stakes test
(20%).
32

Id. at 13. The study suggests that the small sample size of schools may have caused the difference in 9th grade
scores due to "idiosyncratic failures in program implementation'' at specific schools.

33

ld. at II.

34

The System for Teacher and Student Advancement. http://www.tapsystem.org/. The other three "TAP Elements
ofSuccessH are ''multiple career paths, ongoing applied professional growth, and instructionally focused
accountability.''

8

The mixed empirical results suggest that performance-based compensation has the
potential to increase student ~chievement, but only under specific conditions.35 The studies that
show performance-based compensation does not lead to increased student achievement provide
guidelines for future implementation of compensation systems. For example, in addition to the
unique circmnstances of the New York City SPBP, the n1aximum bonus awarded per teacher was
$3000. A $3000 bonus for a teacher whose salary is $70,000 is much different than a teacher
who makes a base salary of$45,000 with the potential for a $25,000 bonus. A minimal bonus is
little incentive for teachers to expend significantly more time, energy, and thought into their
teaching. It is even less incentive to attract people into the field of teaching. Although
opponents of perfom1ance-based compensation use this data to conclude that such programs do
not affect student achievement, the only conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that
bonuses equivalent to 5-10% of a teacher's salary do not affect student achievement. 36
The potential of performance-based compensation to increase student perforn1ance is
twofold. It not only incentivizes teachers to become more effective, but it also has the ability to
attract more talented people to the teaching profession. Given the short-term nature of all studies
35

K. Muralidharan & V. Sundararaman, Teacher Incentives in Developing Countries: Experimental Evidence from
India (National Center on Perfom1ance Incentives, 2008). The mixed empirical record is not limited to the United
States. A study in India indicated a positive association between performance-based compensation and student
performance. For every one percentage point increase L11.improvem.ent .above 5%, .teachers re.c.eived an incremental
bonus. In addition to using a high stakes tests~ the researchers created a high order-thinking assessment that they
believed better assessed more "genuine improvements" in learning rather than test skills. The study also indicated
that teachers were more willing to assign homework, offer time outside of class~ and focus on low performing
students.
In contrast~ a performance-based compensation program implemented in Mexico did not show any difference in
student performance between the students of teachers eligible for performance-based compensation and those who
were not. L. Santibaftez, et. al., Breaking Ground: Analysis ofthe Assessment System and Impact ofMexico's
Teacher Incentive Program "Carrera Afagisterial" (RAND Corporation (2007).
36

Similarly, the conclusion that can be drawn from the POINT study is that setting an exceptionally high standardstudent performance in the 95th percentile-is not an effective incentive. Teachers may not buy in to the incentive if
they do not think they are capable of affecting such a drastic change in student performance.

9

of performance-based compensation in the United States, it is impossible to determine the effects
a performance-based compensation system would have on attracting people to the profession. 37
Such data~ however, can be found by con1paring the compensation systems of countries who
have extensive experience with performance-based compensation and those that do not. The
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) conducted a n1ultinational
study and found that there is a significant association between whether teachers receive
performance-based compensation and the nation's PISA38 math and science test scores. 39 The
drawback to a multinational study, however, is that the performance-based compensation
systetns vary drastically antong different countries. 40 Therefore, the study only indicates the
effectiveness of performance-based compensation, in general. Unlike the results from domestic
studies, the OECD data does not provide guidelines for effective implementation of
performance-based con1pensation systems.

Rob Taylor~ Major Nashville Study Shoots Down Merit Pay. 6 No. 11 EDUCATION EMPLOYMENT LAW BULLETfN
(Nov. 2010). U.S. Department of Education spokesperson~ Peter Cunningham~ criticized the POINT study saying
that it is too narrow because it only addresses whether increased compensation motivates teachers to try harder. He
remarked, "What we are trying to do is change the culture of teaching by giving all educators the feedback they
deserve to get better while rewarding and incentivizing the best to teach in high-needs schools and hard-to-staff
subjects. This study doesn~t address that objective."
37

38

PISA is an assessment given to 15-year-olds in 65 countries. Howard L. Fleischman, et.al., Highlights from PISA
2009: Pelformance of U.S. I 5-Year-Olds in Reading, Mathematics, and Science Literacy in an International
Context (National Center for Education Statistics, December 7, 201 0).

39

Ludger Woessman, Cross-Country Evidence on Teacher Performance Pay (15 IZA DP No. 5101, 2010).

40

!d. at 5. For example, in Finland teachers receive individual bonuses based on professional proficiency and
perfonnance at work. In Portugal and Turkey, bonuses are detennined by supervisors whereas in Mexico bonuses
are detennined hy student perfcrmance.

10

Section II: The Implementation of Merit-Based Compensation Outside of New Jersey

As early as the 1970s there was litigation regarding whether a teacher could be
terminated for failure to n1eet certain student outcomes. 41 In Scheelhaase, an Iowa school district
terminated a teacher for "below average scholastic accon1plishment of [her] students in the area
of [her] responsibility (Language Arts)."42 The teacher challenged her tern1ination arguing that
using student perfom1ance as a criterion was a violation of substantive due process because the
use of student test scores in evaluating teacher effectiveness is not a supported educational
practice. The trial court found the grounds for termination to be arbitrary and capricious, but the
8th

Circuit Court of appeals reversed finding there was no substantive due process violation

because the test scores were an objective measure. 43 The Fourteenth Amendment requires only
that an objective evaluation instrument be used to evaluate teachers. 44
Minnesota created a program under which its school districts may apply for funding by
implementing certain education reforn1s. 45 CtuTently~ 50 Minnesota school districts and 54
charter schools participate in the program. 46 The purpose ofMilmesota's Quality Compensation
41

Scheelhasse v. Woodbury Cent. Cmty. Sch. Dist. 488 F.2d 237 (8th Cir. 1973). See also St. Louis Teacher's Union
v. Board ofEduc., 652 F.Supp 425 (1987). English language arts and mathematics teachers filed a lawsuit against

the St. Louis Board of Education for using their students' standardized assessment results in determining their
"unsatisfactory'' rating. The teachers alleged that there was an equal protection violation because the Board of
Education only used standardized assessment results in the evaluation of English language arts and mathematics
teachers. The Board of Education moved to dismiss the case. The court granted the motion in part on the grounds
that there was neither an alleged suspect classification nor deprivation of a fundamental right. (The court denied the
motion to dismiss the teachers' allegation of a substantive due process violation.)
42

!d. at 239.

43

!d. at 242.

44

LAWRR-ICE F. ROSSOW & JMmS 0. TATE, TI·ffi LAW OF TEACEmR EvALUATIOt-I 37 (2nd ed. 2003).

45

M.S.A. § l22A.213-214.

46

Minnesota Department of Education, Quality Compensation for Teachers,
http://education.state.mn.us/MDE/Teacher Support./QComp/index.html (last visited December 5, 2011).
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------------

---

(Q Comp) program is to "provide incentives to encourage teachers to in1prove their knowledge

and instructional skills in order to improve student learning and ... to recruit and retain highly
qualified teachers~ encourage highly qualified teachers to undertake challenging assignments~
and support teachers' roles in improving students' educational achievement. 47 School districts
can apply for Q Comp by creating~ with the support of the teachers' union, a restructured pay
system. The compensation system tnust "reform the 'steps and lanes' salary schedule." In 2007,
the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Education rejected a school district's
proposal for a reformed compensation system under the Q Comp statute. 48 The compensation
plan satisfied the statutory requirement that at least 60% of compensation increases be based on
teacher evaluation. Under the school district's proposal, however, it was still possible for a
teacher to remain on the traditional "steps and lanes" compensation scheme. The Court of
Appeals of Minnesota held that the compensation plan required real reform of the traditional pay
schedule rather than the mere addition of a bonus. 49
Arizona in1plen1ented its Career Ladder Progran1 for over 25 years. 50 Similar to
Minnesota's Q Comp program~ school district participation was optional. Twenty-eight districts
participated in the program in which districts create the requirements of each "rung" of the salary
ladder. It was sintilar to the "steps and lanes" notion in that it vvas a matrix considering multiple
factors but the difference was that the "steps'' and "lanes" were based on evaluations, classroom
performance, student progress, and whether the teacher took on additional responsibilities. In
47

M.S.A. § 122A.414 (1).

48

SaukCentre Educ. Ass'n v. Seagren 741 N.W. 2d 398.

49

!d. at402

50

.Arizona Department of Education, Arizona Career Ladder, http://www.azed.gov/highly-qualified(last visited December 5, 2011 ).

Qrofessionals/arizona~career-ladder/

12

addition to voluntary school district participation, within each school district, teacher
participation was voluntary as welL Among participating school districts, however, 70% of
teachers chose the Career Ladder Pro grant over the traditional "steps and lanes" system. In
February 2010, a court declared the progrru.n to be unconstitutional because, due to lack of
funding, the Arizona legislature would no longer allow new districts to apply. 5 1
More recent legislation has created compulsory teacher contpensation reforms. In May

2011, the Indiana legislature passed two education refom1 bills. The first, Senate Bill 1,
establishes teacher evaluations that categorize teachers as highly effective, effective, needing

improv€nl€nt, and ineff€Ctiv€. 52 T€ach€rs that ar€ rated as ne@ding in1prov€ment or in€ffective
cannot receive a raise the following year. Instead, pay increases are determined by several
factors including students' standardized test scores, students' yearly academic growth, classroom
observations, seniority, education, and school leadership roles replacing the former "steps and
lanes" cotnpensation scheme. 53 Senate Bill 575 limits collective bargaining to wages and wagerelated benefits.

54

Unions cannot negotiate the means for determining contpensation.

51

Center for Educator Compensation Reform, Arizona, http://cecrdev2.leamingpt.org/map/map.cfin?id=59 (last
visited December 5~ 2011).
52

S.B. 1, ll7thGen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2011).

53

Similarly, Wyoming recently enacted several new laws mandating changes to teacher employment. Teacher
evaluations must be based in part on student performance. To retain tenure, teachers must earn at least a
"satisfactory" evaluation under the new evaluation system. Additionally, a new law expanded the grounds for
teacher termination to include "inadequate performance as determined through annual performance evaluations."
Hart Holland, The Legislators Go Home, 16 No.4 WYO. EMP. L. LETTER (Apr. 20 11).
In Michigan, four related bills were introduced that would affect teacher evaluation, tenure, and termination. Under

the proposed law, three consecutive "ineffective" evaluations would be grounds for termination, teacher evaluation
would be partially based on student growth, and teacher effectiveness would control teacher layoffs. Peter Luke,
Michigan Senate Approves Broad Overhaul to Teacher Tenure Law (June 30, 2011) http://www.mlive.com.
54

S.B. 575, 117th Gen. Assem.~ Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2011).
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Florida recently passed its Senate Bill 736 requiring that student academic growth
account for at least 50% of teacher perfotmance evaluations. 55 A teacher's evaluation will
determine, in part, the teacher's compensation. The law also eliminates previous provisions that
required seniority to be a factor in detemuning which teachers are laid~off. After Senate Bill 736
was passed, the Florida Education Association (FEA) filed a lawsuit arguing that the law is
unconstitutional as a violation of the "Right to Work" clause of the Florida Constitution. 56 The
FEA argues that the new law violates teachers' rights to engage in collective bargaining with
respect to wages and the terms and conditions of en1ployment. 57 If, in fact, the law violates
teachers' rights under the state constitution, in order for the law to be upheld there must be a
compelling state interest in interfering with teachers' collective bargaining rights and the law
n1ust provide the least restrictive tneans necessary to attain that interest. 58
Florida courts are familiar with litigation relating to performance~ based compensation for
teachers. In 1986, the FEA filed a lawsuit against Dade County School Board after the school
district honored a select group of teachers with a $3 000 award for outstanding teaching. 59 The
Court h@ld that the award did not fall und@r th0 d@finition of a wage and thus was not subj0ct to
collective bargaining. 60

55

S.B. 736 (Fla. 20 II).

56

"The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of membership or non.,.membershlp in
any labor union or labor organization. The right of employees, by and through labor organizations~ to bargain
collectively shall not be denied or abridged." F.S.A. Const. Art. 1 § 6
57

Complaint at 8, Robinson v. Robinson, No. 20 II CA2526 (2nd Cir. 20 II).

58

The Florida Commissioner of Education filed an Answer on November I, 20 II denying all claims. Answer,
Robinson v. Robinson, No. 2011 CA2526 (2nd Cir. 20 II).

59

United Teachers ofDade v. School Board ofDad~ County~ !992 WL 494954 (Fla. Cir. 1992).

60

!d. at2.

14

States are following the lead of the Obama administration by incorporating student
performance into teacher evaluations, creating performance-based compensation plans, and
passing tenure refonn. In fact, for many of these states, such changes were part of their Race to
the Top application for federal funding. 61 By enacting analogous refotm measures, New Jersey
would be joining numerous other states that are n1aking changes to increase student performance.

Section lll: Education in New Jersey: Past, Present, and Proposed Future
A. The History of Educational Inequity in New Jersey
New Jersey has an extensive history of educational inequity and, until recently, the
judicial system has been the primary lever used by refonners. In 1875, the state constitution was
amended to include, "the Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a

thorough and efficient (emphasis added) system of free public schools for the instruction of all
the children in the State between the ages of five and eighteen years. ''62 The meaning and
interpretation of the "thorough and efficient" clause in the context of educational inequity was
the subject of a series of subsequent New Jersey Supreme Court cases.
In Robinson v. Cahill, the Supreme Court of New Jersey expanded the meaning of the
"thorough and efficient" clause. 63 "The Constitution's guarantee must be understood to embrace
the educational opportunity which is needed in the contemporary setting to equip a child for his

61

For example, New York developed a new system of teacher evaluation that is based, in part, on student
performance. Student performance on statewide measures of student growth constitutes 20% of teacher evaluations
and an0ther 20% is e0mprised 0f l0eal measures 0f student aehievement. New York State United Teachers ex rel

Iannuzzi v. Board ofRegents ofthe University ofthe State ofNew York. 2011 WL 3802147 (2011).
62

N.J.S.A. Const. Art. 8, § 4, ~ 1.

63

Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473 (1973).
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role as a citizen and as a competitor in the labor market. " 64 Although the Court held that the
Public School Education Act of 1975 (PSEA)65 was facially constitutional in Robinson V, 66 the
Court held the PSEA was unconstitutional when the legislature failed to provide the funding it
required. 67 The legislature funded the PSEA only after the court issued an injunction.
Beginning in 1985, another series of cases further expanded the requirements of a
''thorough and efficient" education. In Abbott v. Burke (1990), the Court found the PSEA
unconstitutional as applied to poor urban school districts. 68 The Court held that "thorough and
efficient" required that the "poorer urban districts have a budget per pupil that is approximately
equal to the average of the richer suburban districts ... and be sufficient to address their special
needs.'' 69 The state could not allow funding to depend on property tax. Rather, the funding for
poor urban school districts must be mandated by the state. Furthermore, the funding in these
districts had to sufficiently provide for the special needs of these districts given the extren1e
disadvantages of their students. In response, the legislature passed the Con1prehensive Education
Improvement Financing Act of 1996 (CEIF A). 70 In Abbott v. Burke (1997), the Court held that
CEIFA did not provide sufficient funding to ensure that the poor urban districts were able to
meet the "thorough and efficient'' standard. 71 Finally, in 1998, the litigation expanded to address
64

Id at 515.

65

N.J.S.A. A8A:7Awl.

66

Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 449 (1976).

67

Robinson v. Cahill70 N.J. 155 (1976).

68

Abbottv. Burke, 119 N.J. 287 (1990).

69

/dat 389.

70

N.J.S.A. 18A:7F47

71

Abbottv. Burke 149 N.J. 145, 152 (1997).
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not only adequate funding for poor urban districts but also adequate services for the students in
those districts. 72 The Court ordered services including technology programs, school-to-work
programs, college-transition programs, full-day kindergarten, half-day preschool for three- and
four-year-olds, on-site health services, and art, 1nusic, and special education programs. In effect,
the Court held that the state must fund and provide services to make up for disadvantages
inherent in poorer urban districts.
Despite nearly a half-century of litigation, student performance disparities still exist
between richer suburban school districts and their poorer urban counterparts. 73 The judiciary's
concentration on compensatory funding and the implementation of additional services in poor
urban school districts has not eliminated educational inequity in New Jersey.

B. The Current New Jersey Law and Practice Relating to Teacher Evaluation and
Compensation
New Jersey enacted tenure in 1909 to protect teachers fro1n negative political influences
in public schools. 74 In New Jersey, tenure is granted to teachers after three years and one day of
service. 75 Loss of tenure may occur for "inefficiency, incapacity, unbecoming conduct, or other
just cause."76 The original rationale for tenure at the university level was to safeguard academic

72

Abbott v. Burke, 153 N.J. 480 (1998).

73

See infra note I 0 I and p. 24.

74

N.J.S.A. I8A:28w5.

75

N.J.S.A. 18A:28=-5(a).

76

N.J.S.A. 18A-26(b).
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freedom. 77 Many argue that tenure is redundant when teachers are also afforded procedural and
substantive due process protections. Furthermore, it inhibits a principal's ability to retain the
most effective teachers and remove the ineffective ones. It guarantees teachers a job, even if
they are ineffective. Some even argue that tenure causes lower pay for teachers: "Because
tenure .. .is a valuable employment benefit that substitutes in part for salary, it tends to hold down
teacher pay, which in turn affects who does and doesn't seek to enter this line of work and who
does and doesn't stay there." 78 Even some teachers' unions are supportive of changes to current
tenure practices. 79
State law also determines the role of seniority in situations in which tenured teachers are
dismissed due to staffing reductions. 80 When a vacancy then opens, the dismissed teacher with
the longest length of service must be the first teacher reemployed. 81
In contrast to the state's role in regulating tenure and seniority, teacher evaluation and
compensation are almost entirely under the purview of collective bru~gaining. The only stateimposed regulation on teacher compensation is an $18,500 salary floor. 82 In the absence of state
77

Chester E. Finn, Nobody Deserves Tenure, EDUCATION NEXT (February 4, 20 11)
http://educationnext.org/nobodv-deserves-tenure. The corTesponding rationale for public school teachers was that
they wanted protection from losing their jobs over arbitrary reasons such as disagreeing with an administrator or
influential parents. At the public school level tenure was more a protection fi·om cronyism than an academic
safeguard.
78

!d. at 2.

79

Trip Gabriel & Sam Dillon, G.O.P. Governors Take Aim at Teacher Tenure, THE NEW YoRK TIMES (January 31,
2011 ). The American Federation of Teachers supported a Colorado law that allowed school districts to remove
teachers that had been consistently rated "ineffective.''
80

N.J.S.A. 18A:28-1l.

81

N.J.S.A. 18A:28-12.

82

N.J.S.A. 18A:29-5. This statute was enacted in 1985 and is outdated. Currently, the average salary ofNew Jersey
teachers is approximately $63,000. Statehouse Bureau Staff. New Jersey Teacher Pay, Experience and Education
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/20 I0/05/nj teachers pay freeze salarie.html (last visited December 5; 2011).
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regulation~ the current salary schedules for teachers follow the "steps and lanes'' contpensation

scheme. Teacher evaluations have no effect on compensation. Thus, a teacher rated
"distinguished" receives the same salary as a teacher rated "unsatisfactory" who is on the same
"step" and "lane."
State law allows school districts to withhold salary increments. 83 The Board of Education
of the Township of South Brunswick withheld the salary increment from a teacher who struggled
with classroom management. The court held that the school district had a reasonable basis for
withholding the salary adjustment. 84
State law mandates only that non-tenured teachers be evaluated three times per year and
tenured teachers be evaluated once per year. ss In the majority of school districts~ the largest
component of teacher evaluation is the classrootn observation component: an administrator
observes a single lesson and then evaluates the teacher's ability to manage a classroom, engage
students, clearly present academic content, etc. A smaller contponent of teacher evaluation is the
completion of professional responsibilities: maintaining accurate records, timely submission of
lesson plans, satisfactory attendance, etc. Applying this evaluation n1ethod, only teacher actions,
rather than student actions and performance, are considered in the evaluation. This encourages
teachers only to "dot their 'i's and cross their 't's" rather than ntotivating them to ntake informed
decisions to increase their students' performance.

On a "steps and lanes~~ scheme~ withholding a salary increment means that the teacher will stay on the same "step"
the following year even though the teacher has accumulated an additional year of teaching experience.
83

84

Brown v. Township ofSouth Brunswick Bel ofEduc., 92 N.J.A.R.2d (EDU) 560 (1992).

85

N.J.S.A. 18A:27-3.1
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By focusing solely on teacher actions, teachers are evaluated on factors others (principals,
teachers' unions, school district administrators) deem to be the characteristics of a good teacher.
Instead of encouraging teachers to strive to be highly effective, teachers are limited to the
expectations of their evaluator. Furthermore, a teacher could be "highly effective" in every
category of the evaluation rubric, yet that teacher's students may still not be learning. A
comparison of current student achievernent data and teacher evaluation results illustrate this
incongruity.
Despite New Jersey's progress in school finance reform over the past four decades, the
disparities in educational outcomes persist. In the 2009-2010 school year, of Newark Public
School's 72 principals, 27% were rated Distinguished, 60% were rated Proficient, 10% were
rated Basic, and only 3% were rated Unsatisfactory. 86 In the same year, ofthe school district's
3392 teachers, 11% were rated Distinguished, 86% were rated Proficient, 2% were rated Basic,
and only 1% were rated Unsatisfactory. 87 Ninety-seven percent of Newark Public Schools'
teachers were Proficient or Distinguished, but the passing rate of Newark students on high stakes

The Newark Public Schools Teachers' and Principals' Evaluation Rating for the 2009~2010 School Year.
http://www.nps.k 12.nj. us/22861 056107 42800/b lanklbrowse.asp? A=3 83&BMDRN=2000&BCO B=O&C=60 169
(last visited December 5~ 2011).

86

87

!d. Teacher evaluations were based on Charlotte Danielson's Teacher Evaluation Framework and focused on four
domains: planning and preparation, classroom enviromnent, instruction, and professional responsibilities. Student
performance was not a eomponent ofthe evaluations.

The same incongruities were noted in Denver Public Schools and Cincinnati Public Schools. In the 2007~2008
school year, only 1.45% of Denver Public Schools teachers were rated "unsatisfactory" in a binary system. Seventyw
five of the 88 Denver schools that did not meet AYP that year did not have a single "unsatisfactory" teacher. In the
same year, 40 Cincinnati schools failed to meet AYP. Not a single teacher in any of the schools received an
"unsatisfactory" rating. Daniel Weisberg, et al. The Widget Effect: Our National Failure to Acknowledge and Act
on Differences in Teacher Effectiveness ll-12 (The New Teacher Project 2009).
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tests were significantly lower than their counterparts in richer suburban districts. 88 Logic and
reason would suggest that teacher evaluation data should mirror student achievement data.
The answers to the questions~ "Is this teacher an effective teacher?" and "Are their
students learning?" must be the same. If the answer to the latter question is "no,'' then how can
the answer to the former be "yes"? In order to see the same answer to these questions, teacher
evaluations must include measurements of student achievement. Governor Christie's proposed
legislation does just that.
On March 1, 2011, the New Jersey Educator Effectiveness Task Force submitted a report
to the New Jersey Department of Education outlining a proposal for education reform affecting
teacher evaluations, teacher compensation, and tenure. 89

On April13, Governor Christie

proposed legislation based on the report's recommendations. The proposed legislation creates a
new teacher evaluation systen1. Teachers will be evaluated twice per year. The legislature will
set parameters on the evaluation tools that measure effectiveness, which are currently negotiated
through collective bargaining. Teachers will be categorized as highly effective, effective,
partially effective~ and ineffective. 90
The recon1mended evaluation framework requires that teacher evaluations be split evenly
between the outputs of learning and the inputs associated with learning. Under the new teacher

88

State ofNew Jersey Department of Education 2010 Assessment Reports (January 2011)
http://www.nj.gov/education/schools/achievement/2011/.

89

New Jersey Educator Effectiveness Task Force, Interim Report (March 1, 2011)
http://www .nj .gov/education/educators/effectiveness.pdf.
90

Nash, sup;ra note 4.
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evaluation system~ SO% of a teacher's evaluation is derived from student performance and the
other SO% is derived from teacher practice. 91

In conjtu1ction with a new teacher evaluation system, Governor Christie's proposal also
calls for the implementation of a new evaluation system for school principals.92 Principal
evaluations would be divided into three components: measures of effective practice (40%),
differential retention rate of effective teachers (1 0%), and measures of student achievement

(S0%).93
Governor Christie also proposed changes to the current tenure system in which teachers
and principals would attain tenure following three consecutive years of a "highly effective" or

91

New Jersey Educator Effectiveness Task Force, supra note 89, at 12. Of the 50% allotted to student performance,
70-90% is based on growth on state assessments, I 0% is based on a schoolwide performance measure., and 0-20% is
based on other perfmmance measures (to be determined through collective bargaining). Other performance
measures may include graduation rates, SAT scores, college matriculation rates, student retention rates, etc. Of the
50% allotted to teacher practice, 50-95% is based on classroom observation tools and 5-50% is based on other
measures of practice.
92

R.L. Mendro, Student Achievement and School and Teacher Accountability, 12 JOURNAL OF PERSONNEL
EVALUATION IN EDUCATION, pp. 263-264 (1998). A study conducted in Dallas Public Schools found that the most
significant factor in the effectiveness of a school is its principal. "The quickest way to change the effectiveness of a
school, for better or for worse, is to change the principal.''
93

New Jersey Educator Effectiveness Task Force, supra note 89, at 12. The 10% allotted to the differential retention
rate of effective teachers would reward principals for hiring and retaining effective teachers and removing
ineffective teachers. This empowers principals with the role of human capital manager and would require principal
autonomy in making teacher employment decisions. Like tenure, this offers teachers protection from politics and
discrimination without proving guaranteed job security to ineffective teachers. Of the 50% allotted to student
achievement measures, 70% is based on the aggregate growth on standardized state assessments while the remaining
30% would be determined by measureable, school-specific goals.
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"effective" rating.

94

A tenured teacher or principal could then lose tenure following two

consecutive "partially effective'' ratings or one "ineffective" rating. 95
Although Governor Christie is an outspoken advocate for perforn1ance-based
compensation for teachers, he has not formally proposed a detailed compensation plan for New
Jersey.

96

His proposals connect student performance to teacher evaluations and connect teacher

evaluations to tenure, but do not set up a connection between student performance and teacher
compensation.

Section IV: A Plan to Incorporate a Performance-Based Compensation System into
Governor Christie's Proposed Educational Reform Legislation
A. The Problem: United States Students Underperform Compared to Their
International Counterparts; The "Achievement Gap" Persists in the United States
The goal of any employn1ent con1pensation system should be to motivate employees to
perform at their greatest potential. American employers began to utilize performance-based
compensation in the early 20th century when there began to be a danger of losing jobs to foreign

94

Gabriel, supra note 79. Governors in Florida, Idaho, and Nevada have also called for tenure reform. Nevada
governor, Brian Sandoval, calls for the elimination of tenure in the face of impending layoffs because .it will allow
school districts to dismiss teachers based on competence rather than seniority. According to Florida governor, Rick
Scott, "Good teachers lmow they don't need tenure. There is no reason to have it except to protect those that don't
perform as they should."
9

~ Nash, supra note 4.

96

Chris Christie, Governor of New Jersey, Remarks by the Governor at the Old Bridge Town Hall Discussion (Sep.
28, 2010). http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2010/09/gov christie advocates merit p.html. "Any type of
compensation that allows for anything but merit- gone."
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n1arkets. 97 Employers implemented such compensation schemes to increase job performance,
thus making American products more competitive.
There is evidence that U.S. students are being "out-schooled" by students in other
industrialized nations. 98 The Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) is an
assessment that measures the reading literacy, science literacy, and mathematics literacy of 15year-olds in the 34 countries that are members of the OECD.99 The United States ranked 14th in
reading literacy, 25th in mathematics literacy, and 17th in science literacy. 100 Thus, the
motivation of An1erican employers in the early 20th century to implement performance-based
compensation now faces the American education system. If our students are going to remain
competitive internationally, their teachers must be motivated to create more marketable students.
Within the United States there is an achievetnent gap between the performance of lowincome minority students and middle-class white students. Typically the achieven1ent gap refers
to the underperformance of African-American and Hispanic students. The gap appears in grades,
standardized test scores, graduation rates, college matriculation rates, and other measures of
acadenuc performance. 101

97

R.L. Heneman & M.T. Gresham, Performance-Based Pay Plans in Smither, J.W.; Performance Appraisal: Stateof-the-Art Methods for Performance Management (Jossey-Bass, 1998).
98

Fleischman, supra note 38.

99

!d. at 4. PISA only administers the assessment to 15-year-olds with the assumption that it provides a picture of
what students know and are able to do at the end of their compulsory schooling.
wo !d. at 8; 18; 24.
101

National Governors' Association Closing the Achievement Gap
http://www.subnet.nga.org/educlear/achievement/ (last visited December 5, 2011).
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There is a teacher quality gap that corresponds to this student achievement gap. An
international study found that out of 46 countries, the United States ranked 42nd in its ability to
provide an equitable distribution of its high-quality mathematics teachers. 102 The research
showed that 68% of upper-income gth grade students in the United States had a high-quality
mathematics teacher~ compared to 53% for low income gth grade students. The United States'
15% teacher quality gap is significantly higher than the 42-country average of2.5%. 103 A
national study also illustrated the teacher quality gap by showing an association between the
percentage of students who are eligible for free and reduced lunch and the frequency of tenured
teachers who deliver poor instruction. 104

B. The Solution: Couple Governor Christie's Proposed Legislation with a
Performance-Based Compensation Scheme that Incentivizes Teaching in
Underperforming Schools
In 1985, the New Jersey Legislature declared that:
"a. Attracting and retaining the most able individuals to the profession of teaching is
critical to the future welfare of our State and our citizens.

102

Motoko Akiba, et.al. Teacher Quality, Opportunity Gap, and National Achievement in 46 Countries, 36
Educational Researcher 369 (Oct. 2007).
103

Id at 372. The researchers encountered a methodological challenge in measuring teacher quality. They measured
teacher quality using four binary factors: full certification, mathematics major, mathematics education major, and
teaching experience of more than three years. Since the premise of this paper is that teacher quality should be
measured by student performance rather than teacher characteristics, it is important to note the distinction between
an effective teacher (measured though student performance) and a qualified teacher.
104

Weisberg supra note 87, at 18. Teachers and administrators were asked, "In your opinion, are there tenured
teachers in your school who deliver poor instruction?'' Schools in which 76-100% of students qualify for free and
reclueeclluneh had a ~~yes" resp(mse rate of60% and 84%) fram·teaeh.ers and selwal adm:inistrators, respectively. In
schools in which 25%-75% of students qualify the ''yes" responses decreased to 56% and 75%, and in schools in
which less than 25% of students qualify the "yes" responses decreased to 42% and 65%.
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b. The starting salary levels for new teachers have fallen significantly behind the starting
salaries paid to other recent college graduates.
c. A competitive starting teacher salary is an additional means of attracting and retaining
outstanding individuals in the teaching profession." 105
Although three decades have passed since these legislative declarations~ their truth
remains. To increase the academic achievement ofNew Jersey's students, schools must attract
and retain great teachers and remove the ineffective ones. To eliminate the achievement gap~
there must be greater incentives for teachers to teach in the worst-performing schools. To this
end, the New Jersey legislature should ntandate that teacher contpensation be based on teacher
evaluations which, under Governor Christie's proposal, would consist of student performance as
the primary component.
The successful implen1entation of performance based compensation in New Jersey n1ust
have five characteristics: (1) the amount of the performance-based con1pensation is significant~
(2) the performance-based compensation is incremental and predetermined, (3) a teacher's
placement is a significant factor in determining compensation, (4) teachers cannot opt out of the
performance-based compensation system and (5) student performance is the primary indicator of
teacher effectiveness.r 06
The purpose of the first two characteristics is to provide incentive for current teachers to
increase their effectiveness and to attract more people to the teaching profession. The SPBP
105

N.J.S.A. l8A:29-5.2.

106

Because the fifth characteristic is already an element of Governor Christie's proposal and has already been
addressed on p. 21, the fifth characteristic is not discussed further in Section IV. In Section V, however, there is a
discussion of the related issue of problems that arise in measuring student performance.
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study showed that a $3000 bonus did not adequately incentivize teachers to change their
behavior.

107

The POINT study dernonstrated that even when school districts offer a large

incentive of $15,000, if the incentive appears unattainable then student performance remains
unaffected.

108

Similar to POINT, TAP offered a large incentive, a $12,000 maximum bonus.

TAP, however, placed teachers into five levels based on the number of standard deviations their
students' scores were from the mean. 109 The study showed the conclusive effectiveness across
grade levels of the TAP performance-based compensation system. An effective performancebased compensation system will have multiple levels of rewards and a significant maximum
bonus.uo

An international study provides some additional guidelines as to the amount of
compensation required to attract talented people to the profession. 111 The study focused on
teachers from Singapore, Finland, and South Korea, all PISA top-performers. 112 These three
countries vievv the caliber of their teachers as a national priority. They have a rigorous teacher
selection process and training that is more akin to U.S. n1edical school and residency than to the

w7 Marsh, supra note 20.
108

Springer. supra note 28.

109

Springer~ supra note 30.

110

Since there are a limited number of studies of performance.,.based compensation systems, there is no evidence as
to the "optimal" number of reward levels or maximum bonus. Based on the studies cited in this paper, the TAP
program provides a starting point for detennining these factors.
111

Auguste, supra note 5.

uz On the PISA, Korea ranked I st in math and reading literacy and 3rd in science literacy among OECD countries.
Finland ranked 2nd in math and reading literacy and I st in science literacy. Among non~OECD countries, Singapore
ranked 3rd in math and science literacy, and 2nd in reading literacy. Fleischman, supra note 98 at 8, I8, 24.
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typical U.S. College ofEducation.u 3 In the U.S. only 23% of teachers are top-third university
graduates.

114

Increasing the percent of top-third teachers in high poverty schools to 68% would

require paying new teachers approximately $65,000 and creating a maxin1um compensation of
$150,000. 115
The third characteristic of an effective performance-based compensation system in New
Jersey is that school and subject placement is a significant factor. 116 This characteristic
addresses the disparities in student perforn1ance between students in poor urban districts and
middle-class suburban districts and the associated teacher quality gap. 117 Teachers in historically
ru1derperforming schools should be paid more than their counterparts in schools that historically
reach their student performance targets. 118 Additionally, to achieve true equality, this pay
schen1e must be consistent throughout the state, not just within individual school districts. 119
This essential characteristic also addresses the argument that there are factors outside the
teacher's control that affect student performance. One study indicates that school-level factors
113

Auguste, supra note 5 at 6. Additionally, students training to become teachers often receive a salary or stipend
and receive competitive compensation once they become teachers. Society bestows enormous prestige on the

profession.
ll

4

!d. at 6. Fwi:hetmore, only 14% of teachers in high~poverty schools are top~third graduates, again illustrating the

U.S. teacher quality gap. !d. at p. 9 citing U.S. Department of Education Baccalaureate and Beyond Longitudinal
Survey (200 1).
us !d. at 7.
116

For example, Teacher A works at an underperfonning school. Teacher B does not. If both teachers receive the
same evaluation rating (based on Governor Christie's legislative proposal), Teacher A makes significantly more than
TeaeherB.
117

It is analogous to taking the Abbott v. Burke notion of compensatory funding and applying it to human capital.

118

Even though I classify schools as ''underperforming'' and those that "historically reach their student performance
targets,'' I am not implying that the compensation should be binary. Rather, it should be a spectrum also based on
the extent to which each school underperfotms or historically reaches its student performance targets.
119

Furthermore, the state would be wise to hire professionals to determine a compensation scheme that would
achieve the optimal distribution of teachers according to their effectiveness.
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and teacher-level factors account for 7% and 13% of variance in student performance,
respectively.

120

Student characteristics, such as home environment, intrinsic motivation; and

prior knowledge account for the other 80%. 121 The pay disparity in the compensation proposal
takes this 80% into account. Because of differences in the home environment, motivation, etc. it
is going to require a n1ore effective teacher to achieve the same results in one school than in
another and this should be reflected in teacher compensation.
The fourth factor, making teacher participation in the performance-based compensation
system compulsory, would distinguish New Jersey's system from the ones implemented in
Minnesota and Arizona. If the system is voluntary, ineffective teachers will opt to use the "steps
and lanes" scheme which acts as an incentive for ineffective teachers to remain in the profession.
By no means are these five characteristics the only conditions that must be satisfied in
order to implement an effective performance-based con1pensation system. The following section
addresses common problems with performance-based con1pensation and offers solutions that
eliminate or minin1ize those problems.

R.J. Mazano~ A New Era ofSchool Reform: Going Where the Research Takes Us (Aurora, CO: Mid-Continent
Research for Education and learning, 2000) www.mcrel.org.
120

Eva L. Baker~ et al., Problems with the Use ofStudent Test Scores to Evaluate Teachers 12 (Economic Policy
Institute, 2010). Other factors include the student's attendance, other teachers, the quality of the curriculum, class
size, team teaching, tutoring, and out-of-school learning experiences. Parents also play a significant role in the
academic performance of their children. Some students have parents who are well-educated, supportive~ and able to
help their children with homework. Other parents, for a variety of reasons, are not able to support their children in
the same way.
121
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Section V: Past Pitfalls in the Implementation of Performance-Based Compensation and
Proposed Solutions 122
There are empirically-based arguments in opposition of performance-based
con1pensation.

123

Those arguments, however, are not inherent in perfonnance-based

compensation itself, but rather arise in specific performance-based compensation schemes.
A common argument is that performance-based compensation creates a disincentive for
teachers to work with high-need students: those that are already academically behind, students
with limited English proficiency, special needs students, etc. 124 However, by using student
growth percentiles to measure student performance, perfom1ance-based compensation will not be
a disincentive to teaching the lower performing students and special needs students. 125 Student
growth percentiles can be used to prevent a comparison between "apples and oranges." They
measure a student's growth by comparing their current academic achievement relative to their
academic peers-those students that began at the same starting point. For example, if a student
earns a raw score of 20 on the pre-assessment, then his percentile will be calculated based on the
post-assessment performance of all other students who also scored a 20 on the pre-assessment.
This method is more advantageous than raw student growth data because the student's starting

122

Section IV proffers five non-negotiable characteristics of an effective performance-based compensation system.
Section V, on the other hand, makes suggestions of possible solutions to other issues that arise in planning and
executing perfomtance-based compensation systems. For example, in Section V, student growth percentiles are
suggested as a way to meastrre student growth. The use of student growth percentiles, however, is not essential to
the successful implementation of performance-based compensation.
~Z.3 Lewis C. Solomon & Michael Podgtrrsky, The Pros and Cons of Performance-Based Compensation (lvlilken
Family Foundation, 1999).
124

Baker, supra note 121, at 6.

Damien W. Betebenner, A Primer on Student Growth Percentile ~.J"ational Center for the Improvement of
Educational Assessment, 2008).
125

30

point is no longer a factor that could unfairly affect the teacher's evaluation. It takes the
student's past education experience and preparation out of the equation. 126
The sante method also applies to special needs students. A special needs student who
scores a 20 on the pre-assessment will only be con1pared to other special need students who also
scored a 20 on the pre-assessment. Therefore, a teacher's performance with respect to a special
needs student will only be measured relative to the performance of other teachers with a special
needs student. Using student growth percentiles to measure student perfortnance, and ultimately
teacher effectiveness, negates the potential impact that the use of test scores would have to
discourage teachers from working with the students most in need of an effective teacher.
Others fear that performance-based compensation hinders teachers from working
collaboratively. 127 Surveys of teachers that participated in the D.A.T.E. program indicated that
the more years the school had participated in the performance-based compensation program, the
more likely teachers were to report higher ratings of teacher competition. 128 One of the
advantages of Minnesota's Q Comp program is that the restructured pay system must "encourage
collaboration rather than competition among teachers." 129 As long as the compensation reward is
predetermined, there will be no need for competition. Additionally, progress toward school-wide

126

Suppose Student A scores a 10 (out of 100) on the pre-assessment and a 45 on the post-assessment. Student B
scores a 70 on the pre-assessment. Even if Student B scores a 100 on the post-assessment, his growth (calculated
either as a percent change or as a difference in raw scores) could never exceed Student A. Student growth
percentiles eliminate that situation because Student B would only be compared to other students who scored a 70 on
the pretest.
~ 27 Victor Lavy, Using PeTformance-Based Pay to Improve the Quality of Teachers, 17 THE FtJTURE OF CHILDREN

87 ~ 92 (2007).
128

Springer, supra note 25~ at xii.

129

~-A:.S.A. § l22A.414~2(b)(6).
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or department-wide goals could also be a component of a teacher's evaluation, thus encouraging
teacher collaboration.
There is also a concern that an unintended consequence of perfomtance-based
compensation is that teachers willrnerely "teach to the test." 130 Analogous situations occur in
companies where outcomes are overemphasized. "Managers praise the ends~ but give greater
weight to the means." 131 One way to avoid this effect is to create rigorous assessntents that test
higher-order thinking: application, analysis, synthesis, and evaluation, thus disincentivizing a
teacher from merely teaching facts, skills, and test strategies. There are multiple concents with
performance-based compensation that involve the student assessment. Proposing an effective
assessment program for all grades and subjects that is measurable, rigorous, and reliable, is an
issue in itself. For example, New Jersey only assesses language arts literacy, ntathematics and
(in 3rd- gtll grade) science. Additionally, students are only assessed once in high schooL To
accurately implement a performance-based contpensation system, each teacher's students must
be evaluated at least once each year to determine their proficiency in the subject matter taught.
Reforms to the current way student performance is assessed in New Jersey must accompany a
perfonnance-based compensation scheme.
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Lavy, supra note 126, at 92.
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Harry Levinson, Appraisal of What Performance?, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW (July 1976)
http:/lhbr.org/1976/07/appraisal-of-what-performance/ar/1. Levinson shares a story to illustrate the problem in
performance appraisal and management by objectives: the misconception that only the "what," and not the "how," is
being assessed. The story is of a senior executive who was placed in charge of a failing project. Within two years,
the project was producing a seven-figure profit, but the senior executive had achieved it "singlehandedly, by the
sheer force of his own personality.'' The corporate president infonned him that until his approach changed, he
would not be promoted. In education, how students process, learn, and understand information is equally as
important as (if not more important) than what they learn.
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It is critical, too, that the assessments are a reliable measure of student performance. If
there is a lot of variation in a teacher's performance year-to-year, the incentive's effect will
decrease, particularly if a teacher performs significantly worse one year than they did the
previous year.

132

Those who oppose performance-based compensation argue that a student

could perform differently on the exact same assessn1ent depending on whether she had breakfast,
or a good night's sleep, or a lucky guess on a multiple choice question. 122 Furthermore, studies
show year-to-year fluctuations in the performance of the same teacher's students. One study
evaluated teacher effectiveness based on student test scores in five urban districts over two years.
Alnong the teachers ranked in the bottom 20% in year 1, only one-third were in the bottom 20%

in year 2. In fact, another third were in the top 40% the following year. Similarly, among
teachers ranked in the top 20% the first year, only one-third were ranked in the top 20% the
second year. 134
Again, this study illustrates the importance of fmding and implementing the right
perfom1ance-based compensation system. A possible solution to this issue is to consider a larger
sample of the teacher's students. For example, a teacher's compensation may be determined by
the average student performance over n1ultiple years. Instead of a teacher's con1pensation being
detemuned by the performance of the 24 students he taught this year, it is determined by the
aggregate performance of the 72 students he has taught over the past three years. This system
minimizes year-to-year changes in compensation.

132

Herzberg, supra note 10, at 118. Herzberg illustrates this point: "If I get a bonus of$1,000 one year and $500 the
next, I am getting extra rewards both years, but psychologically, I have taken a $500 salary cut."
133

Baker, supra note 124, at 11.

134

!d. at 12.

33

Finally, performance-based compensation raises the issue of funding. In June 2011~ the
New Jersey legislature cut teachers' benefits resulting in decreased salaries for the 2011-2012
school year.

135

Given the current econon1ic situation, it is arguable that the state does not have

the funding to support a performance-based con1pensation progran1. 136 This argument~ however,
assumes that teachers' base pay would remain their current salary and would be supplemented by
performance-based compensation. Instead, New Jersey could implement a performance-based
compensation scheme that replaces the "steps and lanes" system altogether. The money that will
be saved by placing all teachers on the same "step" can then be redistributed based on teacher
effectiveness. 137
While numerous perfom1ance-based compensation systems have failed and there are
multiple arguments against such systen1s, those results and arguments are unique to specific
compensation systen1s. Performance-based compensation has the potential to escalate student
Dutcon1es, through increased teacher eff€ctiv~ness, if it is implemGnted the right way.

Conclusion:
Time is of the essence. The President of the United States is calling for educational
reform. Governors and legislatures are backing legislative measures that overhaul traditional
135

Statehouse Bureau Staff, N.J. Assembly Passes Landmark Employee Benefits Overhaul (Jooe 24, 20 11)
http://www.nj .corn/po litics/index.ssf/20 II /06/assemb ly passes landmark emp lo.html.
136

See Arizona Department ofEducation, supra note 51. Arizona's Career Ladder Program was cut last year
because there was not adequate funding to support the perfonnance-based compensation program.
137

A simplified example is to examine the potential salary redistribution between a first-year teacher and a teacher
with 15 years' experience. A first-year teacher in Newark Public Schools with a Bachelor's degree earns $50,000
per year. Their counterpart with .l S years' experience earns $89,241 per year. If, instead, both teacher-s earned a
salary of$50,000 per year, then the $39,241 could be redistributed between the two teachers. If the two teachers are
equally effective then each teacher would receive $19,710.50, a larger bonus than any study discussed in Section I.
Again, this is just one of many solutions. The purpose of this example is to illustrate that the issue of funding does
not categorically preclude the success of a performance-based compensation system.
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practices in education. States are changing their tenure laws, the methods they use to evaluate
teacher and student performance, and are restructuring the way they compensate effective
teachers. These broad~ sweeping changes will change the landscape of public education in the
United States. The question is, "Will it be for the better or for the worse?" As the United States
continues to fall farther behind other countries in math, science and reading, and as the
achievement gap persists in the United States, it is ilnperative that these changes be made "for
the better."
Performance-based compensation can increase the educational outcomes of New Jersey's
students. To do

so~

however, it must be carefully planned and implemented so that it not only

increases student performance, but also narrows New Jersey's achievement gap. By developing
a plan that considers a teacher's placement as a significant factor in compensation, New Jersey
can motivate its best teachers to teach its most underprivileged students.
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